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The Suppression of Radio and Newspaper -Comment on
Pending Criminal Tris
On July 8, 1948, just as a negro handyman was about to go on trial
for the murder of two eleven year old girls in the city of Baltimore,
Maryland, four radio stations blandly broadcast that the accused had
confessed to the crimes. On a subsequent program on July 9, further
details of the confession, the previous- criminal record and other conduct
of the prisoner were broadcast, as well as an alleged re-enactment of
the crimes. Promptly the four stations, WSID, SFBR, WITH, and
WCBM, and the news editor of WITH, were cited for contempt of
court. The action was consummated on January 28, 1949, in Re Maryland Broadcasting Company,' when three of the stations (WSID having

been absolved) and the WITH news editor were convicted of contempt
of court for violating Rule 904 of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore. 2
The Contempt Rule

Rule 904 is an aggregate of contempt provisions devised in 1939 by
the judges of the Criminal Court of Baltimore and adopted by the
Supreme Bench (Baltimore courts of first instance) as an aftermath
of abusive publication concerning a so-called "torso murder" ease. Six
separate provisions prescribe the various acts which are made punishable
by contempt.3 A detailed analysis of the Rule is impractical here;4
however, it is worthy of note that the more important substantive proI In re Maryland Broadcasting Company (Baltimore City Criminal Court, 1949),
17 LW. 2381.
2 Supreme Bench of Baltimore, Rule 904: Photographs, Statements for Publication,
etc. "Ordered this 25th day of April, 1939, by the Criminal Court of Baltimore, that
in connection with any case which may be pending in this court, or in connection with
any person charged with crime and in the custody of the Police Department of Baltimore City, or other constituted authorities, upon a charge of crime over which this
Court has jurisdiction, whether before or after indictment, That any of the following
acts shall be subject to punishment as contempt:
(1) The making of photographs of the accused without his consent.
(2) The making of any photograph in violation of Rule 48 of the Supreme Bench
of Baltimore City.
(3) The issuance by the Police Authorities, the State's Attorney, counsel for the
defense, or any other person having official connection with the case, of any statement relative to the conduct of the accused, statements or admissions made by the
accused, or other matter bearing upon the issues to be tried.
(4) The issuance of any statement or forecast as to the future course of action of
either the prosecuting authorities or the defense relative to the conduct of the trial.
(5) The publication of any matter which may prevent a fair trial, improperly
influence the court or the jury, or tending in any manner to interfere with the administration of justice.
(6) The publication of any matter obtained as a result of a violation of this rule.
s Rule cited note 2, vupra.
4 For a personalized analysis by the author of Rule 904, see an address by Judge
Emory F.'Niles , Contempt by Publication, 45 Md. Bar Ass'n. Proceedings 133 (1940).
50
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hibitions are contained in provisions three, four and six of the Rule.
These provisions state that all details and occurrences up to the time
of arrest of the accused may be made public, but that from the time
of arrest, no information about the conduct of or confession by the
accused, or other admissions or statements bearing upon the alleged crime
may be issued by any public officer, including counsel, or made the subject of public comment. Thus,' once the prisoner is in the custody of
the police, no statements, whether admissions, cofifessions, exculpatory
declarations, or new evidence, should be published. Although not apparent from a reading of the Rule, additional results have been attributed
to it by interpretation; that at no time may an accused's past criminal
record be publicized; and that anything, including confessions, brought
out at the preliminary hearing is freely publishable. This latter concession is justified on the basis that the preliminary hearing, like the
trial, is a public proceeding, so that anything revealed therein may be
reported. 5
Although the power to punish by contempt is inherent in the courts
and although many states have contempt statutes, research has failed
to reveal any similar previous instance where trial courts have taken
it upon themselves to formulate a precise, written contempt rule to
govern news comment. 6 Furthermore, in the nine years during which
Rule 904 has been in force, the newspapers have not seriously challenged
its validity, and in the present case the Baltimore press had kept knowingly silent after the arrest. Four radio stations, however, chose to
ignore the Rule, or perhaps to test it, resulting in one of the rare cases
on record in which a radio station has been cited for contempt and found
criminally guilty of "trial by publication. ' 7 The trial, judge ruled
that in such cases, where adverse or erroneous publicity might prejudice
a defendant's right to an impartial trial, freedom of speech and the
press must be and could be legally curtailed. He concluded that the
broadcasts had "an effect that members of a jury panel would be bound
to carry into a jury room," and that this constituted an action punishable by contempt.8
5 A very detailed and comprehensive interpretation and criticism was delivered by
Hon. Joseph Sherbow, Ass It Judge, Supreme Bench of Baltimore, at the 53rd Annual
Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association, June 24, 1948. Reprinted: Baltimore
Daily Becord, June 25, 1948.
6 Unfettered by any Constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and press,
England has prohibited abuses by publication by statutory enactments. Some of these
laws restricting freedom of the press are as follows: The Criminal Justice Act, 1925,
15 and 16 Geo. V, c. 86, §41; The Judicial Proceedings Act, 1926, 16 and 17 Geo.
V, c. 61, §1(1); Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, 51 and 52 Vict., c. 64, §3. As a
result of these statutes, once a person has been charged with a crime, the English law
prohibits publication of evidence that might prejudice a fair trial for the accused.
It also forbids linking a suspect to crime other than the one with which he is
charged. No similar legislation may be found in the United States.
7 Re Shuler, 210 Calif. 377, 292 Pae. 481 (1930) ; People ex rel. Supreme Court v.
Albertson, 275 N.Y.S. 361 (1934) were cases not involving the radio stations. but
were contempt citations of individual defendants who had broadcast on the radio
accusatory speeches charging misconduct and impartiality against judicial officers.
In the former, conviction was upheld on the basis of the doctrine of the Toledo Newspaper case; the latter conviction was reversed.
s It should be mentioned that the Court found provision five of Rule 904 unconstitutional in that it violates the First Amendment. Provision five is set out in note 2
supra. This 'catch-all' provision, as Judge Gray labeled it, was apparently based upon
the original federal doctrine of "reasonable tendency"2 and is too broad under the

"lear adpresent danger" doctrine. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U.S. 402 (1918); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Inasmuch as a repre-

CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS

[Vol. 40

Contempt by Publication
The inherent power of the court to protect its prisoners or its litigants
against interference by irresponsible or perhaps interested agencies and
to prevent perversion or obstruction of just proceedings in the court,
particularly by abusive publication, has been recognized since Blackstone's undelivered opinion in 1765. 9 A federal statute' 0 and numerous
state laws 1 have also specifically conferred these powers on the courts.
Heretofore, however, the actual scope of such power has been left undefined, its authority being administered on a case-to-case basis. In each
case the judge must resolve the conflict between the right of free speech
and press and the basic concept of an independent judiciary, as well
as the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. After detailed
consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident
being tried, he must decide which of the fundamental rights are to be
sacrificed.
It is on the basis of this oft-repeated procedure that the "clear and
present danger" doctrine has come to be the accepted yardstick in contempt litigation. The inception of this doctrine and its application to
publication contempts needs no reiteration. 12 It is only significant here
that as a result of the United States Supreme Court cases of Bridges v.
California,13 , Pennekamp v. Florida,14 and Craig v. Harney,'5 little
doubt remains that in order for an act to be punishable "the substantive
evil which it creates must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."16
Keeping in mind Rule 904 and the case which has provoked its investigation, it is necessary to consider momentarily the import of the "clear
sentative of the Supreme Court Bench has recognized the separability of provision
live of the rule, it would not seem that its apparent invalidity should defeat the rule
or prejudice the rights of the litigants. The c6nviction by Judge Gray was apparently
founded on a violation of provisions three and six. It is interesting to note that numerous organizations have intervened on the respective sides in this case for purposes of
appeal. Supporting the conviction are: The Maryland Civil Liberties Committee, The
Junior and Senior Bar Associations of Baltimore and the Maryland State Bar Association. Intervening for the appellant are: The American Society of Newspaper
Editors, The American Newspaper Publishers' Association, The National Association
of Broadcasters, and allegedly The American Civil Liberties Union.
9 Wilmot, Notes and Opinions of Judgments (1765). For extensive material on
the courts' general and specific powers of contempt, "contempt by publication," and
"trial by newspaper," see Sir John Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (1927) ;
Sullivan, Contempts by Publication (2d ed. 1940); Radin, Freedom of Speech and
Contempt of Court (1941) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 599; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 401; Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33 (1941); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923); 159 A.L.R. 1379 (1945).
10 The original 1831 statute is now recognized in two separate sections. U. S. Code
(1926), §385 (Jud.) and U. S. Code, §241 (Crim.).
11 Pa. Laws, 1808-09, c. 78, P. 146; N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) Part 3, c. 3, t. 2, Art. I,

§10.

12 Mr. Justice Holmes created the clear and present danger doctrine in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), a ease involving the circulation of seditious literature. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) it was adopted by the court as
the yardstick in prosecutions for contempt by publication, superseding the "reasonable tendency" test of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
13 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
14 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
15 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
16 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). For further explanation and discussion of the "clear and present danger" doctrine see Notes: (1947) 32 Cornell L.Q.
413; (1947) 27 Neb. L. Rev. 92; (1942) 15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 367.
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and present danger" rule as reflected by the decisions of the Supreme
Court. Neither a definition of the doctrine nor a prescription of its
precise limitations can be extracted from the cases.17 On the contrary,
the Supreme Court Justices have expressed the positive belief that
neither definition nor boundaries are desirable; that the working principles must be flexible; and that a test is only valuable when it can be
moulded to the particular facts of the particular case.' 8 In his concurring opinion in the Pennekamp case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter specifically decried the use of "formulas embodying vague and uncritical
generalizations" because they "offer tempting opportunities to evade
the need for continuous thought." 1 9
A reading of the Bridges, Pennekamp, and Harney cases reveals also
that a case need not be pending, in the technical sense of the word (lis
pendens), in order for the court to find that an abusive publication has
created a "clear and present danger" to its fair administration.2 0 The
Court looks upon "pending" as a relative term and has specifically
explained that any substantial limitation as to time or space must, of
necessity, be an arbitrary one. Again, all related circumstances must
be considered before a positive determination as to the imminence of
the danger can be resolved. 2 1
17After setting out the "clear and present danger" rule, Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941), Mr. Justice Black continued: "We recognize that this
statement, however helpful, does not comprehend the whole problem. As Mr. Justice
Brandeis said in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374:
'This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger
shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present.' "
18 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Pennekamp case, at page 367, stated:
"Since at the core of our problem is a proper balance between two basic conditions
of our constitutional democracy-freedom of utterance and impartial justice-we
cannot escape the exercise of judgment on the particular circumstances of the particular case." In Craig v. Harney, at 391, it is further pointed out that . . . in
every case coming here from a State court this Court might make an independent
examination of the facts, because every right claimed under the Constitution is a
fundamental right." In the Bridges case, at 261, Mr. Justice Black, drawing from
the Gitlow case stated: "It must necessarily be found, as an original question, that
the specified publications involved created 'such likelihood of bringing about the
substantive evil as to deprive (them) of the constitutional protection.' How much
'likelihood' is another question, a question of proximity and degree 'that cannot be
completely captured in a formula'."'
19 328 U.S. 331, 351. Mr. Justice Frankfurter further reiterated: "'Such formulas
are most beguiling and most mischievous when contending claims are those not of
right and wrong but of two rights, each highly important to the well-being of society.
Seldom is there available a pat formula that adequately analyzes such a problem,
least of all solves it. Certainly no such formula furnishes a ready answer to the
question now here for decision or even exposes its true elements." Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring at 371, explained: ". . . any standard which would require strict
accuracy in reporting legal events factually or in commenting upon them in the
press would be an impossible one. Unless the courts and judges are to be put above
criticism, no such rule can obtain. There must be some room for misstatement of
fact, as well as for misjudgment, if the press and others are to function as critical
agencies in our democracy.. :"
20 328 U.S. 331, 369. " Where the powdr to punish for contempt is asserted, it is
not important that the case is technically in court or that further proceedings, such
as the possibility of a rehearing, are available. When a case is pending is not a technical lawyer's problem, but is to be determined by the substantial realities of the
specific situation." Cf. Ex Parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 159, 160 (1922).
21 The undesirability of confinement in applying the "clear and present danger"
test is expressed by Mr. Justice Black, in his majority opinion in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271: "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the
use of the meeting hall, the radio and the newspaper. But we cannot start with the
assumption that publications of the kind here involved actually do threaten to change
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Another conclusion of the "clear and present danger" cases is significant. Where it is asserted that a defendant has been deprived by a
.state court of a fundamental right secured by the Federal Constitution,
an independent examination of the facts may be made by the Supreme
Court. 22 Every case of summary punishment for contempt by publication will be considered on its merits, regardless of the reasonableness
of state statutes or the conclusions of state courts. 23 Since the holding
in Gitlow v. New York, 24 the Supreme Court has recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment the application to the states of the same standards
of freedom of expression as,
under the First Amendment, are applicable
25
to the federal government.
A cursory analysis of the majority opinions in the Bridges, Penne-kamp and Harney cases would seem to indicate that a set of facts which

would warrant a finding of "clear and present danger" is hardly con-

ceivable. 26 However, such a conclusion does not reflect a complete consideration of the Court's position. In the three cases so far litigated,
the Court has made it clear that convictions were foreclosed upon the
factual situations, and upon those alone. The very nature of the "clear

and present danger" doctrine itself reveals a recognition that valid circumstances could exist to justify a conviction under the "test."

Publi-

cations criticizing a judge or attempting to influence him have been the
only cases considered. Until litigation involving variations of facts and
circumstances has run the gamut, the characteristic of absolutism should
not be attributed to the doctrine.

Gontviotim Based on on Inflexible- Rule
In view of the adverse attitude of the Supreme Court tbward the
imposition of dogmatic rules or formulas to resolve these conteipt probthe nature of legal trials, and that to preserve judicial impartiality,.it is necessary
for judges to have a contempt power by which they can close all channels of public
expression to all matters which touch upon pending cases. We must therefore turn to
the particular utterances here in question and the circumstances of their publication
to determine to what extent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice
was a likely consequence, and whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to
justify summary punishment
22 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
590 (1935); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33 (1941).
23 "When the'other attributes of democracy are threatened by speech, the Constitution does not deny power to the States to curb it. Therefore, every time a situation like the present one comes here, the precise problem before us is to determine
whether the State Court went beyond 'the allowable limi6 of judgment in holding that
conduct which hasibeen punished as contempt was reasonably calculated to endanger
a State's duty to administer impartial justice in a pending controversy."I Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353, 354 (1946).
Note (1946) 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 222.
24 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
25 In declaring the Court's position, Mr. Justice Reed points out, in his majority
opinion in Pennekamp v. Floridaat 336, that in the Bridges case "there was unanimous recognition that California's power to punish for contempt was limited by this
Court's interpretation of the extent of protection afforded by the First Amendment."I
In analyzing the history of contempt by publication, Mr. Justice Black explained
that the state powers in that field had not been tested in the Supreme Court for over
a hundred years. Since the Gitlow ease, however, no doubt has existed as to the
applicability of the federal principles of the First Amendment to the states. Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
26 Note (1948) Wis. L. Rev. 125; Note (1948) 21 Temple L.Q. 272.
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lems, 27 Rule 904 appears very likely to be unconstitutional as an arbitrary restriction of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. In
that the Rule prescribes specific temporal and spacial limits within which
an action must fall to be punishable, it lacks the elasticity and flexibility
required in the "clear and present danger" approach to these contempt
'cases.28 The commission of any act provided in 904 calls for an automatic citation and pu'nishment, regardless of justification or consideration of the circumstances of the case. In each of the leading cases the
Supreme Court has emphasized the necessity of trying each case on its
merits. 29 To reserve in advance an arbitrary area within which a case
is pending, or within which publication is contemptuous, does violence
to this basic philosophy. Justice Douglas reiterated in the Harney case
that publications must be appraised in a setting of the public comment
which preceded and succeeded them, as well as in the light of community
environment which prevailed at that time.' He concluded that the "compulsion of the First Amendment made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids punishment by contempt for comment
on pending cases in the absence of showing that utterances create 'a
clear and present danger! to the administration of justice." 30 The very
character of the "clear and present danger" doctrine, its purpose and
the reason for its formulation oppose- the validity of Rule 904. Thus,
the constitutionality of 904 seems doubtful, to say the least.
If Rule 904 is unconstitutional, the contempt conviction based upon
the Rule is also invalid. Were it not predicated on the rule, however, it
is possible that there exists in the instant case a set of facts which might
well warrant an affirmation of the conviction under the "clear and
present danger" test. Shortly before the trial, the radio stations broadcast that the prisoner had confessed. Not satisfied with that disclosure,
the next day's program announced the details of the confession, revealed
that the accused had a past criminal record, and consummated the broadcast by a brief re-enactment of the crimes. It is difficult to conceive of
acts better calculated to incite public wrath and prejudice or with the
more imminent probability of preventing or interfering with impartial
administration of justice. It must be kept in mind that this was a jury
trial, that the twelve jurors, who were about to go into the court room,
could hardly have escaped being exposed to broadcasts by three different
local radio stations, although it is not indicated that the jurors had actually heard the broadcast. In contrast, the public comment in the Bridges,
Pennekamp and Harney cases were criticisms directed solely toward the
judges and the judicial process. The greater potential threats to justice
in the former situation where prejudice of the jury is the primary effect
was recognized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp v.
Florida.31 While discussing the problems attending "trial by newspaper," he pointed out that the administration of justice is much more
frequently and seriously affected in those criminal cases which are given
great public notoriety in the newspapers than it is in cases where actions
of the courts are criticised in public print. For the latter, the libel laws
provide a remedy in deserving cases, but for the former, there is no
remedy other than the contempt process, and the courts have been re27 Supra note 19.
28 Supra notes 19, 20 and 21.
29 Supra note 18. See Note (1947) 26 N. Car. L. Rev. 183.
30 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947).
31328 U.S. 331 (1946).
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luctant to use it to invade the exalted dominion of freedom of speech
and press. 32 Journalistic sensationalism and irresponsible publication
make it impossible to impanel an impartial jury and increase the burden
of even the most fair-minded judge to provide a fair trial In fact, the
most austere judge may, at times, find it difficult to escape the compulsion of emotional influence resulting from the publication" of the extremely revolting and savage details of a case. Even greater is the
improbability that prospective jurors could be without prejudice or
emotion under such circumstances.
UnrestrictedPublicationvs. Impartial Trial
Freedom of speech and of the press must, of necessity, be jealously
guarded, but not to the point of destroying the cornerstone of our
judicial system-the right to a fair and impartial trial. The radio and
the newspaper are invaluable and indispensable elements in the development of public enlightenment. But there is little to be gained, and
a great deal of damage to be inflicted, by an unrestricted publication
which serves to arouse public indignation and unqualified prejudice
against an accused. 33 It is evident, therefore, that some type of retrietive measure should be effectuated. It would be'unfortunate if the
"clear and present danger" doctrine were carried to the extent of
requiring an actual showing that a jury had been prejudiced or
that a judge had been influenced in his determinations. Such a requirement would impose an almost impossible burden of proof on the
prosecution. The doctrine would be left v ithout practical value; the
accused would enjoy but little guarantee of an impartial trial..
Some publications themselves have recognized the need for restrictive measures, 34 and many responsible newspapers have refused to
32 Pennekanip v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356-368 (1946). For similar comment see
Note (1947) 41 Ill.
L. Rev. 690.
33 It is doubtful that anyone would claim that the subject of the broadcasts in
Re Maryland Broadcasting Co. had even the slightest news value or whs the type of
information necessary to enlighten the public. The use of the fre6 speech aind free
press prerogatives for injurious practices has not been wholly without judicial or
legislative censure. The most recent case of both legislative and judicial approval of

the restriction of freedom of speech was in Kovacs v. Cooper,

-

U.S. _, 69 S. Ct.

448 (1949) in which the Supreme Court upheld a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance
which prohibited the use of "loud and raucous" sound trucks on the public streets.
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, explained: "The preferred position of
freedom of speech in a society that cherished liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience."
34 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, A28 U.S. 331,
364, footnote 12, in which he quoted from an editorial from the Chicago Tribune as
follows: "The Tribune advocates and will accept drastic restriction of this preliminary publicity. The penetration of the police system and the courts by journalists
must stop. With such a law there would be no motivation for it. Though such a law
will be revolutionary in American journalism, though it is not financially advisable
for newspapers, it still is necessary. Restrictions must come." And quoting Le Viness,
Law and the Press, T7w Daily Record, Baltimore, March 11, 1932, on the need for
restriction of the press: "This puts the problem, as far as Court and police news
goes, squarely back where it belongs. in the lap of the judiciary. The Courts must
set standards; the better journals will follow joyously and the gumchewers' sheets
must be whipped into line. The solution is fearless jurists, not afraid of the doubleedged sword of contempt process; intelligent jurists, able to exercise this power in
the best, enlightened public interest.
The Chairman of the Committee on Freedom of Information-American-Society
of Newspaper Editors, on the other hand, has stated that the majority of newspaper
editors today would oppose any restrictions or inroads on the right of the press to.
publish freely and without qualification.
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indulge in scandalizing and sensational publication. Unfortunately,
however, most newspapers have been reluctant to brave the competition
and possible loss of circulation which might result from a curtailment
of their reportorial activities. Effective restrictions, therefore, must
come from some source other than the disseminators of the news.
It would appear from an analysis of the previously discussed Bridges,
Pennekamp and Harney cases that an inflexible rule, formula or statute,
as a basis of a contempt conviction, would not withstand the scrutiny
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the Supreme
Court will ordinarily give greater weight to legislative regulations
than other types of state restrictions, and although "the courts are
inclined to adopt that reasonable interpretation of a statute which
removes it farthest from possible constitutional infirmity," 35 statutes
or ordinances tending to curtail civil liberties will be strictly construed.
Because legislation in this constitutional field must escape the violative elements of being so obscure, vague, and indefinite as to be impossible of reasonably accurate interpretation, 36 or, at the opposite
extreme, of being so specific and confined as to be arbitrary, it is felt
that any attempts to impose restriction on publications by means of
legislation would be unsatisfactory. In what way, then, may there be
any satisfactory control of "trial by publication"?
It is suggested that the leadership in seeking a solution to this
perplexing problem should be assumed within the judicial system.
The action of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore was an advance in the
desired direction. The courts in each state (preferably the supreme
court, with the goal of uniformity in mind) should make declarations of policy which could be used by the radios and newspapers as
guides or standards for the permissible limits of publication. It is
not proposed that the state courts could prescribe the precise boundaries of contumacious actions; but that area within which there is a
likelihood of serious interference with justice and within which the
courts will exercise diligent watchfulness could be laid out with
sufficient clarity to put the publishers on notice. It should be understood that all convictions would be founded on the inherent powers of
the courts to punish for contempt and would not be predicated upon a
'violation of the policies as penal measures. This precaution should
exonerate the policies from the condemnation of basing a conviction
on an arbitrary rule, the element which seems detrimental to the
courts' action in the present Maryland case. It is submitted that the
enunciation of such policies would aid immeasurably in eliminating
from radio and newspaper publications those injurious elements of
publicity which threaten justice and fairness in the judicial process.
CLUFFORD E.
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U.S. _,
35 Mr. Justice Reed, speakin& for the majority in Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 S. Ct. 448, 452 (1949).
U.S. __, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949) ; Saia v. New York, 334
36 Kovacs v. Cooper, U.S. 558 (1948); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).

